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THE CRISIS OF THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON POLAND AND 
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Summary
The financial crisis broke out in 2008 in the United States, spreading on 
other countries to become global. The main objective of the article is to present 
how the financial crisis in the United States hhas influenced other countries, 
mainly Poland and other European countries. The author also presents 
theoretical views on the international transmission of crises, transmission 
channels and selected models. The aim of the presented article is an attempt 
to identify reasons for the current economic crisis, pointing out that it has 
brought about significant changes in the attitude of the governments of the 
most powerful countries in the world towards state interventionism and it has 
led to transformations in the course of economic cycle.
1. Introduction
Recently we have experienced a dramatic growth of financial markets 
powered mainly by globalization and technological progress [Sławiński 2006, 
pp. 11-12]. This global financial system, however, was upset by the crisis which 
appeared in 2008 on the American mortgage loan market and led to serious 
disturbances and uncertainties in the whole global financial market.
The purpose of this paper is to determine how the financial crisis which 
started in the first decade of the 21st century has influenced Poland and other, 
mainly European, countries.
* mgr, Cracow University of Economics, Organizational and Legal Department.
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2. The essence of an economic crisis
 The term ‘crisis’ comes from Greek and means choice, decision-taking, 
coping with, fighting, in which one must act under considerable time pressure. 
Crisis can be associated with such features as: urgency, trauma and its subjective 
consequences in form of negative experiences. From the very beginning of 
history people have encountered crisis situations. They may be caused by chance, 
personal and life failures. Everyone’s life is marked by constant changes being 
the result of critical events. We live in uncertain surroundings and environment, 
where positive and negative values coexist and cause internal imbalance.
We cannot fully predict or control the human behavior. Nor can we predict 
the forces of nature. However, we can limit situations causing crisis and minimize 
its effects. Hard as we might try, we cannot completely eliminate them. Crisis 
is a special phenomenon, appearing within a general and sometimes very long 
process of changes happening around us.
Economic crises, that is periodical slow down of economic activity, appear 
cyclically in the economy. In the past they were caused mainly by external factors, 
such as natural disasters, crop failure, epidemics or political phenomena, such as 
wars. Together with the development of market economy, natural phenomena 
have gradually become less important for the economic situation than economic 
factors [Morawski 2003, p. 9]. Economic crises are a frequent subject of articles 
and books, for example by M. Friedman, A. J. Schwarz, Ch. Kindleberger, H. 
Minsky, P. Krugman.
M. Friedman and A. J. Schwarz (1963) associated the financial crisis 
exclusively with the panic in banking sector. They attributed lower money supply 
to it, which led to serious weakening of economic activity. Such phenomena as 
serious decrease of asset prices or increased number of bankruptcies among 
enterprises were, according to them, not a serious financial crisis as long as they 
did not cause panic in the banking sector. Another definition of financial crisis 
was proposed by Ch. Kindleberger (1978) and H. Minsky (1972). In their opinion, 
financial crisis happens when we can witness one of the following phenomena: 
sudden and abrupt fall of asset prices, bankruptcy of many large financial and 
non-financial institutions, deflation, serious tension in the currency market. 
Many specialists assume in their works that the currency crisis is an element 
of the financial crisis (P. Krugman), while others believe that it may appear 
autonomously, without causing crises in other parts of the financial system, 
though currency crisis often precedes the financial one.
The financial crisis of the first decade of the 21st century accounts for more 
attention paid to the theory of financial instability created by H. Minsky. The 
economic mechanism used by Minsky to explain the process of endogenous 
generation of financial crises is shown in Figure 1 below. The most important 
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role in this mechanism is played by future investment. Decisions concerning 
investment are determined on the basis of predicted profits. In this element of 
his reasoning H. Minsky refers to the views of J.M. Keynes [Minsky 1984a, pp. 
59-70]. 
Figure 1. Economic mechanism in financial instability theory
Source: own elaboration.
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As Diagram 1 shows, the explanation of the financial crisis refers to 
several stages. At the beginning there is surplus of wealth, which leads to 
economic boom, and then inevitable breakdown. The latest crisis contained all 
these elements, namely there was a housing boom and breakdown leading to 
turbulences in financial markets.
3. The crisis in the USA
Global imbalance in financial markets at the beginning of the 21st century 
was caused by maintained high deficit in current exchange in the USA financed 
by the capital flowing from Japan, China and countries exporting oil. American 
households started to spend more than they earned, so they had negative 
savings. In practice it boiled down to financing consumption with taken 
loans secured with the mortgage on this part of property which had not been 
mortgaged yet. This was possible as long as the property prices grew. After the 
Great Depression of 1930s, loan offices supporting construction industry were 
established. Gradual liberalization of their control led to the situation in which 
they started offering mortgage loans without sufficient collateral. The money 
was cheap and easy to obtain. The US government supported the development 
of the housing industry through programs aiming at enabling its citizens to own 
their flats. These activities encouraged the lower control of the risk associated 
with granting subprime loans. 
According to International Monetary Fund, subprime loan is a loan taken 
by the person who meets one or more of the requirements below [IMF, Global 
Stability Report, 2007] :
• bad credit history, resulting from payment delays or client’s insolvency, 
• weak credit scoring (point method of assessing credibility of a person 
applying for a bank loan) or high DTI ratio (debt-to-income ratio when 
financial obligations of a debtor exceed 50% of his gross income), 
• no or partial credit history. 
The constantly growing prices of real estate encouraged credit institutions 
to grant loans even to people without steady income, as it was assumed that 
the property itself is a sufficient security of the loan. These actions accelerated 
the demand for housing properties, increasing their prices to sky rocket levels, 
exceeding their real value.
Excess financial liquidity of the banking sector appeared in 2002-2004, and 
availability of cheap money translated into housing industry boom. As Figure 2 
shows, the biggest number of properties were built in 2003-2005. In this period 
mortgage loans with variable interest rate which had the property as collateral 
were very popular, which caused subsequent periods of debt repayment with 
higher interest rate.
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Figure 2 Number of private houses built in the USA (in thousands)
Source: own elaboration on the basis of data from US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Office of Policy Development and Research.
When excess liquidity appeared, monetary policy was not tightened 
early enough, but on the contrary, it was loosened by lowering interest rates. 
Monetary authorities for some reasons abandoned the monetary policy based 
on Taylor’s principle. At some point, an increased number of debtors stopped 
repaying their debts not only due to high interest rates but also because they 
lacked motivation to pay the installments. Bank debtors started realizing that 
the amount of credit significantly exceeded the value of their properties, so 
they lost the willingness to pay back the debts. At the same time, artificially 
increased prices of properties started decreasing at the end of 2006, which was 
the first symptom of the crisis. In the middle of 2007, subprime bonds turned 
out to be unsecured. 
When the prices of houses in the USA started to fall, in July 2007 two 
investment funds of Bear Stearns Bank went bankrupt. Banks encountered 
gravely serious, billion-dollars-worth losses. These losses proved to be so 
huge that in March and April 2008 the capitals of big US banks (Merrill 
Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup) were 
increased to prevent their bankruptcy. It was feared that bankruptcy could cause 
the domino effect, a wave of bank and enterprise bankruptcies and increased 
unemployment. The rescue capital came from currency reserves of various 
countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, South Korea, Japan, China, Singapore. In 
return for the issue of shares, each bank received from a few to several billion 
dollars. These actions brought only short-lasting effects. On 5th September 
2008, the fourth largest investment bank, Lehman Brothers, after a fruitless 
plea for help from US Central Bank, was forced to file for bankruptcy.
These were not all the causes whose accumulation led to turbulence of 
financial markets. The problems were magnified by passing the risk connected 
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with granted subprime loans to indirect creditors in the process of securitizing 
debt into bonds secured with mortgages. Rating agencies did not assess properly 
the risk carried by these securities. Not many people knew which of these 
securities were highly risky. We still do not know which banks possess the so-
called ‘toxic’ assets in their balance sheets.
The collapse of the market accounts for low trust people had in financial 
sector and low trust it had in itself. Financial institutions and banks limited the 
activity of mutual lending. This caused lower liquidity and increased threat 
of insolvency of the institutions possessing assets based on subprime loans. 
Decreasing numbers of paid back loans forced the banks to take over mortgages 
and their sale at a loss as the property prices were constantly decreasing. 
Governments decided to provide liquidity to the market in order to stop further 
bankruptcies of large financial corporations, without noticing that the main 
problem was in the increased risk.
The next reaction of US monetary authorities to the threat was to loosen 
the monetary policy by lowering interest rates. This was associated by the 
weakening of the dollar and increasing prices of oil. However, all these events 
did not bring positive effect, as they translated into lower sales in car industry. 
The breakdown was very painful. It not only stretched for a period of more 
than a year, but also caused serious loan crisis with severe side effects, which, 
coupled with expensive oil and housing market breakdown, affected the 
whole economy. Moreover, the most globalized market of finance allowed 
uncontrolled spread of toxic assets and financial breakdown.
The question should be asked whether the conclusions from this bad 
economic period should be limited only and exclusively to providing liquidity 
and blaming the banking system for causing the crisis. Of course not. The whole 
complicated course and improper actions of state authorities, international 
organizations, central bank boards and financial institutions were neither 
coherent nor well thought-out. 
4. Transmission of the American crisis into Poland and other 
European countries
The events that initiated the property market crisis in the USA turned out 
a global problem. Together with the development of the situation in international 
financial markets, subsequent institutions started revealing financial losses 
connected with disturbances appearing in the markets. At the beginning the 
information was directly related to subprime loans, but it soon turned out that 
this is only part of the losses. 
Crisis phenomena affected badly especially the countries with advanced 
economies, mainly those with important role of banking systems. The outbreak 
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of the global financial crisis and its unprecedented power of spreading into 
next segments of financial markets and real economy made it necessary to 
initiate coordinated, worth billions of dollars government interventions in many 
countries all over the world, both developed and developing ones. The value of 
public aid assigned to fight the consequences of the latest crisis turned out to 
be the biggest in history, as far as the nominal value and GDP percentage of 
particular countries are concerned.
As a consequence of the bankruptcy of the fourth largest investment bank, 
Lehman Brothers, and the real possibility of bankruptcy of other large US and 
European banks, the inter-banking market experienced the crisis of trust. Banks 
stopped lending money among themselves as they worried about insolvency. 
When in September 2008 Lehmann Brothers announced its insolvency, the 
effects of this immediately reached Europe, especially Germany. It manifested 
itself in lower share quotations at Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The government 
and financial sector representatives drew up a new rescue plan for Hypo Real 
Estate bank which was threatened with bankruptcy (it specializes in mortgage 
loans and in financing public projects). The bank’s troubles had their source in 
a banking subsidiary company Depfa, which was affected by the consequences 
of lower value of debt connected with mortgage loans. The implementation of 
a sound anti-crisis package did not help. Financial institutions tightened their 
criteria of granting loans, which influenced the situation of enterprises, in 
addition, unemployment rose. 
The governments of other European countries, in an attempt to avoid the 
development of the crisis, took immediate action. They tried to rescue financial 
institutions from bankruptcy. So, for example, the governments of the Benelux 
countries (Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg), some of the most urbanized and 
economically advanced countries in the world took control over the biggest 
Belgian bank – Fortis, also a banking and insurance institution – Dexia – was 
threatened with bankruptcy. Two most important financial entities – Fortis 
and Dexia faced aggravating problems which influenced the state of the whole 
banking sector. The government help did not prevent rapid plunge of bank 
shares, whose value decreased by 30% in September 2008. The crisis in the 
financial sector led to increased unemployment rate.
In 2008, the banking system of Iceland, the most developed branch of 
Iceland’s economy, broke down. The consequence of this were the bankruptcies 
of four Icelandic banks (their liabilities proved too big for the GDP of such 
a small country) and a significant decrease of the Icelandic currency value. 
The government of Iceland asked IMF, USA, EU and Russia for help. From 
September 2007 to September 2008 the exchange rate of the Iceland’s currency 
fell by over 70%. In order to defend the currency value the government used 
most of its financial reserves. According to the government the savings were 
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safe, but the foreign currency transactions were blocked. All these financial 
means were not sufficient to stabilize the endangered banking sector, the full 
control of which was taken over by the government. Prices in shops changed 
almost daily to catch up with ever-increasing inflation. As the situation did not 
improve, the country experienced some shortages in sales of fuel and imported 
goods.
On the other hand, in Russia and Ukraine, the payments from bank 
accounts were limited. There was some news about the troubles experienced by 
Hungary, Czech Republic and even Poland. All this was due to the significant 
number of loans taken in Swiss francs and in euro, which further weakened 
local currencies and threatened mortgage insolvency in the above countries 
and further expansion of the banking crisis. Poles experienced stock exchange 
decline associating the crisis (Figure 3).
Figure 3. WIG index quotation during the crisis. Value Turnover (in million 
zlotys)
Source: own elaboration on the basis of data from US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Office of Policy Development and Research.
As Figure 3 demonstrates, shares lost considerably in their value at the end 
of 2008 and at the beginning of 2009.
As Figures 2 and 3 show, lower demand and increased supply on the zloty 
market caused considerable fall of its value, mainly in 2008.
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Figure 4. Changes of the zloty-euro exchange rate during the crisis
Source: EUR exchange rate, Money.pl, http://www.money.pl/.
Figure 4 shows that in July 2008, the euro exchange rate was close to 3.2 
zlotys while in February 2009 it was only 0.08 zloty short of the level of 5 
zlotys.
Figure 5. Changes of the zloty-dollar exchange rate during the crisis
Source: USD exchange rate, Money.pl, http://www.money.pl/.
In countries with liquid currency Exchange rates (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania) the outflow of foreign capital caused the decrease of local 
currency value in relation to euro. Although it increased the competitiveness 
of export and attractiveness of these countries for foreign investors, it also 
brought about inflation-generating increase of imported goods prices and, 
more importantly, increased the debt level of enterprises, households and 
global debt expressed in foreign currency. Some countries (for example 
Czech Republic, Poland) decided that further loosening of monetary policy 
could lead to further devaluation of their currencies, therefore they reacted 
299
to the crisis mainly through expansive budget policy. However, Romania and 
Hungary were  much more severely affected by the crisis and had to ask for 
foreign support while introducing more restrictive budget policy. Slovakia and 
Slovenia, however, due to their membership in the euro zone (this was possible 
due to their internal and external balance) enjoyed a slightly better level of 
protection against uncertainty. However, these countries have to maintain their 
competitiveness in foreign trade now by real growth of productivity, not by 
depreciation of their currency.
Many other countries had established a fixed currency exchange rate 
to euro before within the ERM II mechanism (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania). They were all severely affected by the recession which ended 
the loan-based economic boom of recent years and caused export decline. 
The governments of these states decided to maintain fixed exchange rates 
of their currencies into euro (due to high national debt in foreign currencies) 
and are making efforts to keep low levels of public debt in order to enter the 
euro zone as soon as possible. This means that the correction is made through 
decrease of costs and remuneration and through increase in productivity. A 
restrictive budget policy was adopted, consisting in remuneration cuts in 
public sector, lowering retirement pension and social benefits and increasing 
taxes. In Poland the consequences of the crisis were mainly felt in restrictions 
in providing loans to entrepreneurs and households. In Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia difficulties were mainly caused by lower demand for 
export goods and decreasing private investment, including direct foreign 
investment. Other countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary 
and Romania) were more affected by the crisis, though. In the years preceding 
the crisis they all witness significant economic growth powered by access to 
EU markets and inflow of foreign capital, which led to the development of 
consumption-increasing investment, often based on loans taken in foreign 
currencies, in some countries leading to the loan-powered property boom. 
The financial crisis, however, encouraged capital to search for safer places 
for investment, which was reflected in frequent withdrawal of foreign capital 
from countries perceived as more risky and with limited financial liquidity 
being the consequence of restrictions imposed by foreign banks in provision of 
transnational loans.
In spite of considerable decrease of GDP in comparison to 2008 (5% to 
1.7%), Poland was the only EU country enjoying economic growth in 2009.
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Table 1. Real GDP growth (in percentage)
2008 2009 2010 2011
U.S. 0.0 -2.6 2.7 2.2
EURO 0.3 -4.1 1.7 1.7
POLSKA 5.0 1.7 3.5 4.0
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2010/2.
The GDP growth in Poland was positively influenced by increased net 
exports and total consumption, while negative influence was exerted by lower 
accumulation. The positive speed of GDP growth was also affected by the 
utilization of EU funds and investment related to our preparation to Euro 2012 
championship.
Considering the prospects of economic boom in Poland we should pay 
attention to the fiscal policy, which, after a period of relaxation in 2008, 
in the next years became more restrictive. First of all, expenses, including 
remuneration in public sector, were limited. Adjusting the public finance 
imbalance is in the medium-term perspective vital for curbing the growth of 
public debt and meeting the obligations imposed on Poland within the excess 
deficit procedure. 
It is interesting to note that while southern EU countries experienced 
problems with public finance, Turkey enjoyed a quick pace of economic growth. 
Summing up, Central European countries, including Poland, fared better in 
times of crisis than other countries of Europe and Central Asia.
5. Conclusions
The global financial crisis spurred hot discussion on the role of fiscal policy 
in stabilizing the economic cycle. The experience of developed economies 
so far have not provided a uniform answer concerning the effectiveness of 
fiscal stimuli in moderating cyclical fluctuations. The state of public finance 
in a particular country is one of the most essential factors determining the 
effectiveness of fiscal impulse. High level of deficit and quickly growing 
public debt may considerably weaken the effectiveness of fiscal impulse. The 
influence of expansive fiscal policy on consumption will be then limited due to 
consumers’ expectations concerning consolidation of public finance in future 
years – higher tax burden, resulting from the obligation to service and repay the 
contracted debt. 
Moreover, the power of influence and acceptable scope of expansive fiscal 
policy are strongly determined by the possibilities of financing higher deficit 
by a particular economy, that is indirectly by the stage of development and the 
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situation on financial markets. The crisis accounts for the escape of investors to 
stable advanced economies, which considerably limited the possibility of using 
fiscal policy to stimulating final demand in most of new member states of the 
European Union. 
The subject presented here is very wide and calls for further detailed 
studies.
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